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The possibility of eliminating birth defects, genetic diseases, and disabilities
through gene therapy in utero seems incredible. Yet the Human Genome Project, a
federally-funded project that will map and sequence all 50,000 to 100,000 genes in
each human cell,2 will undoubtedly increase our knowledge of human genetics and
hopefully lead to the cure of many devastating diseases. Biotechnological advances
in gene therapy have already treated thousands of patients.3 By 1994, 2,000 to 3,000
genetic diseases that will likely respond to gene therapy had been identified.4
1

JD: University of Maryland School of Law, 1999; BA: University of California at
Berkeley, 1992. The author is currently a law clerk for Judge Andrew L. Sonner of the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The views expressed herein are those of the author only.
2

See Lori B. Andrews, Past as Prologue: Sobering Thoughts on Genetic Enthusiasm, 27
SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 898 (1997).
3

Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Teen Dies Undergoing Experimental Gene Therapy,
WASH. POST at A1 (Sept. 29, 1999).
4
See Julia Walsh, Reproductive Rights and The Human Genome Project, 4 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN’S STUD. 145, 150 n.26 (1994) (quoting Office of Technology Assessment, U.S.
Cong., Pub. No. OTA-BP-BA-32, Human Gene Therapy -- Background Paper 1 (1984)).
“[G]ene therapy is available in conjunction with the [prenatal] diagnosis, as in the case of Rh
incompatibility. . . . In some cases, blood transfusions were performed to treat Rh
incompatibility.” ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 141 (1995). Furthermore, the Recombinant DNA
Advisory Committee recently gave approval for experimental gene therapy of cystic fibrosis
patients. Cystic fibrosis is an autosomal recessive genetic disorder which usually manifests
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Although gene therapy remains in its infancy and gene therapy in utero remains in
the distant future, legal commentators are already debating issues surrounding the
obligation of a pregnant woman to her fetus.5
Most pregnant women will undoubtedly applaud the biotechnological advances
that will allow prenatal genetic screening technology to properly diagnose and
correct genetic defects such as sickle cell anemia in utero. Refusal of gene therapy
in utero, will likely be rare in pregnancies carried to term once it is established as
safe and effective.6 In some cases, however, women with strong personal or
religious beliefs may refuse gene therapy in utero.7 The issues then becomes
itself in the form of chronic lung disease. Although more traditional forms of treatment have
extended the medical lifespan of patients to twenty-seven years, the disease remains serious
and life-shortening. In addition, cystic fibrosis ‘is the most common lethal genetic disease’
among North American white children. The success of this treatment would affect the lives of
an estimated eight million carriers in the United States, and will almost certainly change the
way known carriers think about having children. Walsh, supra, at 150-51.
The gene responsible for sickle cell anemia, a serious blood disorder, was discovered in
1949, yet there is still no gene therapy for the syndrome. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 900.
The gene that causes thalassemia, a disorder of adult hemoglobin production, has been
identified as an excellent candidate for gene therapy and experimental trials are likely to begin
soon. Walsh, supra, at 149.
5

Compare Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents’ Freedom to Have Children with Genetic
Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 761, 803 (1995) (stating, “ordering a pregnant woman to
undergo fetal surgery to correct a disabling genetic condition . . . would directly interfere with
her conception of herself as parent to that child. . . .”); with John A. Robertson, Procreative
Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 44446 (1983) (arguing that when fetal therapy is established as safe and effective, then a mother’s
refusal may make her liable).
A more likely source of conflict with the fetus’ mother would result from the mother’s
refusal of a fetal therapy established as safe and effective. Such a situation arises from
time to time when a mother refuses an exchange transfusion for a fetus suffering from
Rh incompatibility. . . . A mother’s refusal of therapy in these situations could be the
basis for civil suit or criminal prosecution if it resulted in death or injury to the fetus,
just as a parent’s refusal of necessary medical care for a child can now be the basis for
civil or criminal liability. The fact that the mother must undergo surgery as part of the
fetal therapy procedure would be no defense if the procedure did not present an undue
risk to her life or health. [According to Robertson,] she waived her right to resist
bodily intrusions made for the sake of the fetus when she chose to continue the
pregnancy. . . . A mentally ill pregnant woman whose conduct threatened a viable
fetus could probably be civilly committed to protect the unborn child. Perhaps a
pregnant teenager who became anorectic could be force-fed if she were in the third
trimester and the danger to the fetus were clearly established. In utero surgery
performed through fetoscopy could also be ordered, once its safety and efficacy for the
fetus is established, because fetoscopy does not carry high risks to the mother. . . .
[M]andating fetal therapy and prenatal screening illustrate an important limit on a
woman’s freedom to control her body during pregnancy. She is free not to conceive,
and free also to abort after conception and before viability. But once she chooses to
carry the child to term, she acquires obligations to assure its well-being.
Robertson, supra, at 444-46, 450.
6

See Robertson, supra note 5, at 444 n.120.

7

See id.
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whether a pregnant woman has a legal duty to undergo gene therapy for the sake of
her fetus and whether a court could order a pregnant woman to undergo gene therapy
in utero against her will.
The decision to undergo gene therapy in utero for the sake of a fetus should
legally rest with the pregnant woman rather than the judiciary or the legislature.8
Part I of this article provides an overview of the current scope of gene therapy. Part
II discusses previous court decisions that either granted or denied petitions for
involuntary prenatal intervention. Part III analyzes three reasons why the courts
should not impose gene therapy on pregnant women as the technology becomes
available. First, a policy that mandates gene therapy would place an undue burden
on pregnant women and violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Second, a policy that mandates gene therapy would disparately impact
women based on race, gender, and socio-economic status. Finally, public policy
demands resistance against a policy that mandates gene therapy because of the
ethical dilemmas inherent in a judicial determination of which “abnormalities”
should be “fixed.” Pregnant women should have the right to decide whether or not
to undergo gene therapy in utero regardless of the seriousness of the disability, the
effectiveness of the therapy, the intrusiveness of the procedure, or the reasons for
resisting gene the therapy.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF GENE THERAPY
Gene therapy involves inserting genetic material into cells to correct specific
genetic defects in these cells.9 Gene therapy will likely revolutionize modern
medicine by curing and preventing certain genetic diseases.10 If a prenatal genetic

8
Although there may be a moral duty for the pregnant woman to undergo gene therapy,
this paper addresses only whether there is a legal duty. I disagree with Deborah Mathieu’s
statement that, “To assert that no fetal therapy should be mandated, or that all should be,
would be unreasonable.” DEBORAH MATHIEU, PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM: SHOULD THE
STATE INTERVENE 54 (1991). While it is true that “[d]ifferent therapies promise different
outcomes,” in the case of gene therapy, I believe that even in those few instances in which a
woman might refuse a non-invasive procedure that is guaranteed to correct a life-threatening
condition, the woman’s decision should nonetheless be respected. Id. Mathieu lists six
conditions that must be met in order to justify state intervention: 1) the harms to be prevented
to the future person are grave and irreversible; 2) the physical harm of the intervention to the
mother’s own health is relatively minor; 3) the intervention involves the least intrusive means
available; 4) the intervention will be successful in preventing or at least ameliorating serious
prenatal harms; 5) requirements of due process and equal protection of the law are met, and 6)
the benefits of adopting this type of state intervention as social policy will greatly outweigh
the benefits. Id. at 128. Mathieu concludes that “few, if any, coercive state interventions to
prevent prenatal harms could meet the conditions stated above.” Id. However, I argue that
even if all six conditions Mathieu lists are met, the pregnant woman still has the unilateral
power to decline gene therapy in utero.
9

See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150 (citations omitted).

10

See Maha F. Munayyer, Genetic Testing and Germ-Line Manipulation: Constructing a
New Language for International Human Rights, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 687, 691-94
(1997).
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test reveals that an embryo may have or be predisposed to a certain genetic defect,
gene therapy could be utilized to correct that defect in utero.11
There are two categories of gene therapy: germ-line manipulation and somatic
cell manipulation.12 Germ-line manipulation targets specific germ cells such as
sperm or egg cells.13 Somatic cell manipulation targets all other cells in the human
body.14 Some people are particularly disconcerted with germ-line manipulation
because any resulting genetic changes are passed on to future generations.15 Some
people are equally disconcerted by the fact that gene therapy may also change
physical characteristics such as hair color, eye color, height, and athletic ability.16
Gene therapy may also alter genetically-linked behavioral features such as
personality, talent, intelligence, and even sexual orientation.17
Doctors performed the first authorized gene therapy procedure in 1990 on girls
ages four and nine who suffered from a grave immune deficiency because they
lacked the enzyme adenosine deaminase.18 The doctors removed some white blood
cells, altered them by inserting a gene to produce the missing enzyme, and returned
the altered cells to the girls’ bodies.19

11

See id.

12

See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150; John R. Harding, Jr., Beyond Abortion: Human
Genetics and The New Eugenics, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (1991). My analysis of
mandated gene therapy is the same for both types of therapy, and thus, will be collectively
referred to as gene therapy.
13

See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150; Harding, supra note 12, at 472-73.

14

See Walsh, supra note 4, at 150; Harding, supra note 12, at 472-73.

15

However, the fear that gene therapy may have some impact on the genetic identity of the
human species must be weighed against the benefit of treating diseases. See Walsh, supra
note 4, at 149-50. J.M. Friedman rejects the fear that gene therapy may have permanent
effects upon the germ line stating that “[w]hen viewed at the population level, . . . the effect of
gene therapy of any type on gene frequencies is likely to be much smaller than that caused by
changes that have already occurred because of environmental alteration and improved health
care and sanitation.” J.M. Friedman, Eugenics and the “New Genetics,” 35 PERSP. BIOLOGY
& MED. 145 (1991). Also, the Office of Technology Assessment notes that “altering the germ
line is not unique to gene therapy because several other medical practices — such as
vaccination, cancer chemotherapy, and radiation therapy — also carry this risk.” Id. at 150
n.26 (quoting Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Cong., Pub. No. OTA-BP-BA-32,
Human Gene Therapy Background Paper 7 (1984)). However, in other countries, “[b]ecause
of the permanent nature of GLM [germ-line manipulation] and its potential cosmetic
application, GLM is illegal in several countries.” See Munayyer, supra note 9, at 697.
16

See Munayyer, supra note 10, at 691-94.

17

See id.

18
See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 4, at 149; Barbara J. Culliton, Gene Therapy Begins,
249 SCI. 1372, 1372 (1990).
19

See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 4, at 149. Both girls are still alive and living normal
lives nine years later. Paul Jacobs, Special Millenium Issue/Science & Technology Cutting
Edge/Frontiers: Four Fields that Have Been Shaped by and Are Shaping, Southern California,
Los Angeles Times Magazine 28 (July 25, 1999).
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By 1997, over 550 Americans underwent gene therapy during approximately 100
different experiments.20 By late 1999, thousands of patients have been treated with
various kinds of gene therapy in the United States.21 There is, however, little or no
evidence of therapeutic benefit to patients who undergo gene therapy.22 A federallyappointed committee that investigated gene therapy condemned most of the efforts as
“pure hype.”23 A similarly skeptical evaluation of the effectiveness of gene therapy
was based on a study in which children with Severe Combined Immune Deficiency
(SCID) improved after undergoing gene therapy.24 That study did not conclusively
show that gene therapy caused the improvements by itself because those children
also received the standard medical treatment for SCID.25
No one knows exactly when the technology will allow pregnant women to
undergo gene therapy in utero for the benefit of their fetuses. As gene therapy is
likely to become more common,26 legal scholars and bioethicists must not ignore the
legal and policy implications of gene therapy on pregnant women.
II. COURT ORDERED PRENATAL INTERVENTIONS
Courts generally consider four state interests when they determine whether to
override competent medical treatment decisions: preserving life, preventing suicide,
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and protecting third
parties.27 All four factors weigh in favor of respecting the pregnant woman’s
decision whether to undergo gene therapy in utero for the sake of her fetus.
First, the interest to preserve life is arguably irrelevant. “Although it might be
argued that the State has an interest in the preservation of the potential life of the
fetus, courts have traditionally examined the refusal of treatment as it impacts upon
the preservation of the life of the [decision maker].”28 Second, the interest to prevent
suicide is inapplicable to gene therapy in utero. Third, the interest to maintain the
ethical integrity of the medical profession weighs in favor of the pregnant woman’s
decision because “the medical profession strongly supports upholding the pregnant
woman’s autonomy in medical decision-making.”29 Furthermore, the American
20

See Andrews, supra note 2, at 901 (citation omitted).

21

Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Teen Dies Undergoing Experimental Gene Therapy,
WASH. POST at A1 (Sept. 29, 1999).
22

See Andrews, supra note 2, at 901 (citation omitted).

23

See id.

24

See id. at 901.

25

See id.

26

See, e.g., Robin Herman, Gene Therapy is No Longer a Rarity: Applications for
Experiments are Expected to Quadruple in the Next Two Years, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 1992,
(Health), at 7.
27

See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326, 334 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1246 (D.C. 1990).
28

In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 334.

29

Id. at 335 (discussing the American Medical Association’s recommendation that the
physician’s duty is not to dictate the pregnant woman’s decision, but to ensure that she can
make an informed decision).
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Medical Association Board of Trustees recommends against judicial intervention
when a pregnant woman has made an informed refusal of medical treatment
designed to benefit her fetus.30 Finally, the interest to protect third parties is not
always considered by courts. For example, some courts consider this interest only in
the context of whether a woman’s refusal of medical treatment will cause her own
death and orphan her already-born children.31 Other courts, however, do not
consider this interest to be determinative of a patient’s right to refuse medical
treatment.32
In addition to the foregoing state interests, courts may also consider the
enforceability of a court order. In In re Baby Boy Doe, the court refused to override
a pregnant woman’s refusal of a Caesarean section because the State sought a court
order to compel the surgery but at the same time specifically opposed the use of
physical force against the pregnant woman.33 The court determined that granting and
enforcing such a court order would be repugnant.34 In In re A.C., the court noted
that, “[e]nforcement could be accomplished only through physical force or its
equivalent. A.C. would have to be fastened with restraints to the operating table, or
perhaps involuntarily rendered unconscious by forcibly injecting her with an
anesthetic, and then subjected to unwanted major surgery. Such actions would
surely give one pause in a civilized society, especially when A.C. had done no
wrong.”35 In In re Fetus Brown, the court considered the enforceability of a court
order and declined to compel a pregnant woman to undergo a blood transfusion for
the sake of her fetus.36
Most courts will not override a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical treatment
needed solely for the benefit of her fetus. In Stallman v. Youngquist, the court
refused to recognize a tort action against a mother for infliction of prenatal injuries
because such recognition would subject every act of a pregnant woman to state
scrutiny and thereby intrude upon her rights to privacy, to bodily integrity, and to
control over her own life.37 The court strongly suggested that no consistent and
30

See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 403 (citing H. Cole, Legal Interventions During
Pregnancy, 264 J.A.M.A. 2603, 2670 (1990)).
31
See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 334 (citing In re Brooks Estate, 205 N.E.2d 435
(Ill. 1965)); Winthrop University Hospital v. Hess, 128 Misc.2d 804 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1985));
Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So.2d 679 (Fla. App. 1987). See also infra text
accompanying notes 64-65.
32
See Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990); cf. Norwood Hospital v. Munoz,
564 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1991) (holding that where there is no evidence of the abandonment of
minor children, the state’s interest in protecting third parties will not override a competent
patient’s refusal of medical treatment).
33

See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 335; see also infra text accompanying notes 46-

51.
34

Id. at 335.

35

In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 n.8 (D.C. 1990); see also infra text accompanying notes
37-45.
36

See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); see also infra text
accompanying notes 52-56.
37

See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
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objective legal standard exists by which to judge a pregnant woman’s actions
because “[t]he circumstances in which each individual woman brings forth life are as
varied as the circumstances of each woman’s life.”38 The court reasoned that a fetus
cannot have rights superior to those of its mother because the law will not treat a
fetus as an entirely separate entity from its mother.39
Furthermore, the A.C. court held that a pregnant woman’s decisions regarding
medical treatment for herself and her fetus should be upheld.40 Substituted
judgement should only be considered where a patient is incompetent or cannot give
informed consent.41 In A.C., a terminally ill woman near death was pregnant with a
viable fetus.42 The lower court ordered the woman to undergo a Caesarean section to
save her unborn child.43 Doctors performed the surgery yet both the mother and the
child died.44 The court reviewed the lower court ruling despite its mootness45 and
held that “in virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be decided by
the patient—the pregnant woman—on behalf of herself and the fetus.”46 The court
emphasized that competent persons have the right to make informed choices
regarding medical treatment based on the doctrines of informed consent and bodily
integrity.47 The court determined that the lower court erred by applying a balancing
test to weigh the rights of the pregnant woman against the interests of the state.48
In Baby Boy Doe, the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to compel a pregnant
woman to undergo a Caesarean section when a problem with the placenta caused her
fetus to receive insufficient oxygen.49 Similar to the A.C. court, the Baby Boy Doe
court reasoned that a balancing test should not be used because “a woman’s
competent choice to refuse medical treatment as invasive as a Caesarean section
during pregnancy must be honored, even in circumstances where the choice may be
harmful to her fetus.”50 The court further reasoned that, “a woman is under no duty
to guarantee the mental and physical health of her child at birth, and thus cannot be
compelled to do or not do anything merely for the benefit of her unborn child.”51
38

See id. at 360.

39

See id. at 359.

40

See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990).

41

See id. at 1237.

42

See id.

43

See id.

44

See id.

45

See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1242 (stating that the case was one which is “capable of
repetition, yet evading review”).
46

See id. At 1237.

47

See id. at 1243.

48

See id. at 1247.

49

See In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

50

Id. at 326.

51

Id. at 332.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999

7

68

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:61

The court emphasized that it knows of “no case that suggests that a mother or any
other competent person has an obligation or responsibility to provide medically for a
fetus . . . .”52 The woman eventually delivered a healthy baby boy despite the
physician’s prediction that her fetus had virtually no chance to survive natural
childbirth.53
The Baby Boy Doe court left open the question whether a court could compel a
pregnant woman to undergo a blood transfusion by characterizing it as non-invasive
and relatively risk-free compared to a Caesarean section.54 Three years later,
however, the Fetus Brown court addressed the issue whether a court could compel a
blood transfusion.55 The court refused to compel a pregnant woman to undergo a
blood transfusion for the benefit of her fetus.56 Doctors estimated that the woman
and her fetus had a five-percent chance of survival if she refused to undergo the
transfusion.57 The court rejected the characterization of blood transfusions as
“relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedures” and determined that they are
invasive procedures that interrupt a competent adult’s bodily integrity.58 The court
stated that, “without a determination by the Illinois legislature that a fetus is a
minor . . . we cannot impose a legal obligation upon a pregnant woman to consent to
an invasive medical procedure for the benefit of her viable fetus.”59
Conversely, some courts subject pregnant women to medical procedures against
their will. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority, the court
ordered a Caesarean section over religious objections of a pregnant woman.60
Doctors estimated that there was a ninety-nine percent chance that the child would
not survive natural childbirth and that there was a fifty percent chance that the
mother would not survive natural childbirth.61 Doctor’s further estimated that a
Caesarean section would likely provide nearly a one-hundred percent chance to save
the lives of both the child and the mother.62 Contrary to the A.C. and Baby Boy Doe
52

Id. at 329. “‘Even though we may consider appellant’s beliefs unwise, foolish or
ridiculous, in the absence of an overriding danger to society we may not permit interference
therewith . . . for the sole purpose of compelling her to accept medical treatment forbidden by
her religious principles and previously refused by her with full knowledge of the probable
consequences.’” Id. at 331 (citing In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. App. Ct.
1965)).
53

Id. at 328, 329 (stating the baby was “somewhat underweight” at birth). The fact that the
physician’s prediction was wrong is another reason courts should decline granting petitions for
involuntary prenatal interventions.
54

In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d at 333.

55

See In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).

56

Id.

57

Id. at 398.

58

Id. at 405.

59

Id. at 405-06.

60

Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981).

61

Id. at 86.

62

Id.
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explicit rejections of balancing tests,63 the Jefferson court balanced the rights of the
mother to practice her religion and to refuse the surgery against the right to life of the
fetus and the state interest to preserve the life of the mother.64 The court determined
that medical treatment can be compelled against a competent adult in narrow
circumstances where a balancing test is properly used.65 Jefferson can be
distinguished from A.C. and Baby Boy Doe because the Caesarean section benefited
both mother and fetus rather than the fetus alone and thereby triggered the court to
use a balancing test.66
Similarly, in In re Jamaica Hospital, the court ordered a blood transfusion over
the religious objections of a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness.67 The court determined
that the state interest to protect third parties must be considered because the woman
was a single mother of ten children whose only next of kin was a sister that was
unable to care for children.68 The Jamaica Hospital decision is distinguishable from
court decisions to refuse to order medical treatment for pregnant women because it
considered the welfare of already-born children rather than only the fetus.
Other court decisions that order medical treatment against the will of pregnant
women are not so easily distinguishable. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial
Hospital v. Anderson, a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness refused to undergo a blood
transfusion for religious reasons.69 The court held that a pregnant woman in her final
weeks of pregnancy does not have the right to refuse necessary life saving treatment
when the life of the fetus is also at stake.70 In Crouse Irving Memorial Hospital, Inc.
v. Paddock, the court ordered blood transfusions despite a pregnant woman’s
refusal.71 The woman agreed to undergo a Caesarean section but refused any blood
transfusions based on her deep religious beliefs.72 The court emphasized that parents
have the right to deny their children medical treatment unless they need lifesaving
treatment.73 The court ordered the blood transfusions to protect the health of the
fetus and the mother.74 Similarly, in In re Madyun, a pregnant Muslim woman
whose water had broken for more than forty-eight hours refused a Caesarean section

63

See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.

64

Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 460.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 86; see also supra text accompanying notes 40-53 (rejecting use of balancing test
when an invasive procedure would benefit the fetus alone because a fetus cannot have rights
superior to those of its mother).
67

See In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).

68

Id.

69

See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964).

70

Id.

71

Crouse Irving Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).

72

Id. at 444.

73

Id. at 444-45; cf. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).

74

Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 445.
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based on her strong religious beliefs.75 The court balanced the significant risks to the
fetus against the minimal risks to the mother and concluded that there was a
compelling interest for court-ordered medical intervention.76
The Anderson, Paddock, and Madyun decisions involved life-threatening
situations.77 These decisions also involved fetuses that were gestationally welladvanced and approached “a moral status that is close to, but slightly less strong
than, normative personhood.”78 Gene therapy would likely almost never involve a
life-threatening situation. Gene therapy instead would likely involve attempts to
prevent disabilities. Moreover, gene therapy in utero would most likely occur early
in a pregnancy to introduce normal genes into the chromosomes of the cells of
defective genes.79 Therefore, the Roe v. Wade trimester approach to abortion based
on the “viability” of the fetus80 will not likely be implicated by gene therapy in utero.
Gene therapy would likely occur before the fetus becomes viable. A woman should
not be forced to undergo gene therapy in utero when she has the legal right to abort
the fetus. If gene therapy does occur after viability, however, the Anderson,
Paddock, and Madyun courts would only order gene therapy in utero during lifethreatening situations.
Courts should respect the decision of a pregnant woman regardless of the
viability of her fetus in future cases that involve gene therapy in utero. A pregnant
woman who refuses gene therapy in utero that would only benefit her fetus is
distinguishable from parents who refuse medical treatment for their already-born
children. Illinois courts consistently hold that the state can intervene under lifethreatening circumstances and provide medical procedures over parental objections
once a child is born; however, the state cannot override a competent patient’s
decision for the benefit of a fetus alone.81 Perhaps gene therapy should follow this
distinction. Doctors should not conduct gene therapy in utero without consent. The
performance of gene therapy in utero over the objections of a pregnant woman would
arguably violate her rights to equal protection, privacy, bodily integrity, religious
freedom, and due process. After birth, courts should order risk-free procedures that
prove effective to cure life-threatening diseases over parental objections. At the
same time, courts should never order in utero procedures on pregnant women over
their competent refusal.

75

See In re Madyun, 573 A.2d 1235 (1990) (appendix to In re A.C.).

76

Id. at 1264.

77

See supra text accompanying notes 69-76.

78

CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 179 (1997).

79

See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 4, at 149 (describing the science of gene therapy).

80

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

81

Compare Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952) (ordering a blood transfusion
for an eight day old infant over the parents’ religious objections) with In re Fetus Brown, 689
N.E.2d 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (declining to order a pregnant woman to undergo a blood
transfusion and stating that the legislature must declare that a fetus is a minor before a
pregnant woman’s consent could be overridden) and In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (declining to order a pregnant woman to undergo a Caesarean section).
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III. REASONS NOT TO MANDATE GENE THERAPY IN UTERO
A. An Unconstitutional Burden on Women
The coercion of pregnant women to undergo gene therapy in utero would place
an undue burden on women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.82 Before the enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act,83 courts held that pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause as an
illegal sex-based classification.84 In Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board, the
court stated:
Only women become pregnant; only women become mothers. But Mrs.
Cohen’s leap from those physical facts to the conclusion that any
regulation of pregnancy and maternity is an invidious classification by sex
is merely simplistic . . . . Pregnancy and motherhood do have a great
impact on the lives of women, and, if that impact be reasonably noticed by
a governmental regulation, it is not to be condemned as an invidious
classification.85
In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Geduldig v. Aiello that a state disability
insurance system that failed to include pregnancy within its coverage did not
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of sex.86 The Court stated:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is sex based
classification . . . .
Absent a showing that distinctions involving
pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally
free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such

82

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
83

See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.

84

See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974); Cohen v. Chesterfield Co. Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973).
85

Cohen v. Chesterfield Co. Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973). In Cohen, the
court gave examples of legal government regulations that do not apply equally to men and
women, such as regulations requiring all personnel to be clean shaven and laws that prohibit
adult women from sunbathing topless. Id. at 397. The dissenting judge would have found the
Cohen regulation unconstitutional and stated:
The majority concludes that the regulation does not discriminate against women as
such; it only discriminates between pregnant teachers and other teachers. The
distinguishing factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. The simple question
then arises: Is this sex related? To the simple query the answer is just as simple:
Nobody . . . has yet seen a male mother. A mother, to oversimplify the simplest
biology, must then be a woman.”
Id. at 400-01 (Winter, J., dissenting).
86

See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical
condition.87
Congress responded to the Court’s decisions in Geduldig and General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert88 by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (the “PDA”), as an
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.89 The PDA declared that
discrimination based on pregnancy is facially discriminatory.90 In Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, the Court interpreted the PDA and held that
“discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination
because of her sex.”91
Subsequently, in International Union v. Johnson Controls, the Court held that a
company policy that prohibited women of childbearing age from performing
occupations that might expose them to lead and cause birth defects violated both the
PDA and the Fourteenth Amendment.92 The Court reasoned that male reproductive
capacities were also vulnerable to lead exposure but the policy prohibited only
women from performing such occupations.93 The Court concluded that the policy
explicitly discriminated against women on the basis of sex.94 The Court relied on the
PDA determination that Title VII discrimination on the basis of sex included
discrimination “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.”95 The Court held the policy to be facially discriminatory
“because it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company’s male
employees in the same way as it applied to that of the females.”96

87

Id. at 496 n.20.

88

General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). In Gilbert, the company’s policy of
compensating for all disabilities except pregnancy was not shown to favor men over women.
Id. “Pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, but it is in other ways significantly different
from the typical covered disease or disability.” Id. at 136.
89

Title VII states an employer may not “limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because
of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2003-2(a)(2) (1998).
90

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

91

Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
There was no challenge to the constitutionality of the PDA.
92

International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).

93

Id. at 196-98 (“Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as to whether they
wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job. . . . Johnson Controls’ policy is
facially discriminatory because it requires only a female employee to produce proof that she is
not capable of reproducing.”).
94

Id. at 197.

95

Id. at 198-99.

96

Id. at 199.
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Despite the PDA, not every pregnancy-related discrimination complaint
successfully proves illegal sex discrimination.97 In Dimino v. Staten Island Railway,
a police officer alleged that her employer prevented her from performing her job
solely because of her pregnancy.98 The officer requested to be placed on restricted
duty but she was instead told to go home.99 The court determined that Johnson
Controls was distinguishable because there was no determinant policy that prevented
pregnant police officers from performing certain jobs.100 Rather, the officer
requested to be placed on restricted duty.101 The court held that absent a determinant
policy, there could be no illegal pregnancy-based classification.102
Under the PDA, a gene therapy policy that applies to the reproductive capacity of
men in the same way that it does to women would likely be upheld under Title VII
and the Equal Protection Clause. Genetic alteration of male sperm whose male
genetics hold the disability or disease could actually preempt the issues that arise
from gene therapy in utero. Some suggest that gene therapy can be performed on
males through the use of mice.103 Male sperm could be genetically altered and
produced inside mouse testes before being used to fertilize the female egg.104 The
issues surrounding compelled gene therapy in utero, however, only implicate
women. The policy would therefore “apply to the reproductive capacity of . . .

97

See Dimino v. Staten Island Railway, No. CIV A. CV-97-5927DGT, 1998 WL 760341
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1998); Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 330-31
(1993) (upholding the right of anti-abortion activists to hold demonstrations at abortion clinics
and holding that opposition to abortion does not discriminate against a class of women seeking
abortion). Justice Stevens’ dissent in Bray argued that all pregnancy based classifications
illegally discriminate based on sex and states, “[I]t seems commonsense, that since only
women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant people is necessarily
discrimination against women. . . .” Bray, 506 U.S. at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Rep. Hawkins’ statements in 123 Cong.Rec. 10581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
98

See Dimino, 1998 WL 760341 at *1.

99

Id.

100

Id. at *4.

101

Id.

102

Id. at *5.

103

See Rick Weiss, Science on the Ethical Frontier: Engineering the Unborn, THE WASH.
POST, March 22, 1998, at A1.
One way germline therapy may be done to ensure a man with a genetic disease doesn’t
pass it to his child:
1. Doctors remove the man’s sperm-producing cells, which contain a defective gene.
2. A healthy gene is added to each cell to replace the defective ones.
3. The cells are put into mouse testes.
4. They mature inside the mouse and start producing healthy human sperm.
5. Those sperm, once tested, are used to fertilize a woman’s eggs in a laboratory dish.
6. The resulting embryos are placed in a woman’s womb.
7. She gives birth to a child whose genes are free from the father’s disease.
Id.
104

Id.
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male[s] in [a different] way as it applies to that of the females.”105 Based on Johnson
Controls and Dimino, any policy that compels women to undergo gene therapy in
utero would likely be a sex-based classification.
In Craig v. Boren, the Court set forth a legal standard to evaluate the
constitutionality of gender classifications.106 The Court used an intermediate level of
scrutiny to determine that gender-based classifications “must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives.”107 The Court would likely uphold a sex-based classification
regarding gene therapy in utero based on the legitimate governmental interest in
public health.108 Furthermore, gene therapy procedures performed in utero that
successfully prevent birth defects and diseases are likely “substantially related” to
such a governmental objective because those procedures directly cause the
“successful” outcome. This is not, however, the end of the inquiry. Courts will also
likely consider whether a policy has discriminatory effect109 or whether it places an
undue burden on specific individuals.110
For example, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court examined
whether a school board policy that required pregnant teachers to take maternity leave
five months before their due dates was sufficient means to achieve the legitimate
objective of continuity of instruction.111 The Court determined that the school board
policy served important governmental objectives and was substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives under Craig but examined “whether the particular
means chosen to achieve those objectives unduly infringe[d] upon the [pregnant]
teacher’s constitutional liberty.”112 The Court “has long recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family is one of the liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”113
105
See Dimino, 1998 WL 760341 at *5 (quoting International Union v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 211 (1991)).
106

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding a statute prohibiting males under age
21 and females under age 18 from buying beer to be unconstitutional sex discrimination).
107

Id. at 197. Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion states that the majority’s
intermediate level scrutiny standard “apparently comes out of thin air.” Id. at 220 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice would have applied the rational basis test which would
have upheld the statute as being rationally related to the governmental objective and “permits
the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others.” Id. at 216-17, 221-22.
108

Id. at 199-200.

109

See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 154 (1977) (“Even though a plan which
frankly and unambiguously discriminates against pregnancy is ‘facially neutral,’ the Court will
find it unlawful if it has a ‘discriminatory effect.’”) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra
Part III B describing the likely discriminatory effect of gene therapy in utero.
110

See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).

111

Id. at 641-42.

112

Id. at 647.

113

Id. at 639 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and other cases). If the Supreme Court
can constitutionally guarantee a right to abortion, forcing a pregnant woman to undergo gene
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Similarly, in Nashville Gas Company v. Satty, the Court based its decision on the
imposition of a substantial burden.114 The Court stated that “petitioner has not
merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but
has imposed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer.”115 Under
Satty, the substantial burden test might preclude courts from forcing pregnant women
to undergo gene therapy in utero.
Court compulsion of gene therapy in utero forces a medical procedure upon
women that no man would ever have to bear.116 Those courts would place an undue
burden on pregnant women by forcing them to undergo gene therapy in utero while
at the same time refusing to force others to donate bone marrow or blood to their
living relatives.117
Many courts uniformly decline to force medical procedures upon individuals,
particularly minor children. In Curran v. Bosze, the court declined to order threeyear-old twins to undergo blood tests to determine bone marrow compatibility with
their leukemia-stricken half-brother.118 The mother of the twins resisted the father’s
compulsion and refused to consent to the procedure.119 The court determined that
previous cases of court-ordered medical procedures involved benefits to the potential
donors based on their close relationships with the recipients and the consent of both
parents of the donors.120 Based on Curran, mandated gene therapy in utero would
therapy to prevent a child with a disability or disease should also remain a woman’s choice.
However, even though the right to an abortion disappears at the point of a fetus’ viability, I
argue gene therapy, even for viable fetuses, should not be performed over a pregnant woman’s
objections.
114

See Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1977).

115

Id. at 142. On the other hand, Justice Stevens stated, “Differences between benefits and
burdens cannot provide a meaningful test of discrimination since, by hypothesis, the favored
class is always benefited and the disfavored class is equally burdened.” Id. at 155 n.4
(Stevens, J., concurring). In my analysis, however, imposing a burden on pregnant women
does not benefit men or any “favored class.” I believe the discrimination is that there is no
burden placed on men while there would be a heavy burden imposed on pregnant women.
116

See Walsh, supra note 4, at 164.

117

See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to compel twin minors to
donate bone marrow to a half sibling despite the little risk to the twins and the sibling’s life
depended on the transplant; in fact, the court would not even compel the minors to undergo a
blood test to determine whether they would be compatible donors); McFall v. Shimp, 10
Pa.D.3d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978) (refusing to order Shimp to donate bone marrow to
save cousin’s life); Lausier v. Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 1975) (holding that an
incompetent brother cannot be forced to donate a kidney to save the life of his dying sister);
Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (U.S. App. D.C. 1941) (requiring parental consent,
despite the fifteen year old’s own consent, for removal of a skin patch to benefit severely
burned cousin).
118

See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).

119

Id.

120

Id. at 1331. For example, in Strunk v. Strunk, the Kentucky Court of Appeals granted a
petition for a kidney to be removed from a mentally incompetent ward of the State to be
implanted in the ward’s brother because of the close relationship between the brothers. See
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Ky. 1969). The ward was “greatly dependent upon
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not pass muster without the consent of the pregnant woman to the procedure. A
pregnant woman certainly has a close relationship to the recipient, i.e., the fetus.
However, a policy that forces a competent pregnant woman to undergo medical
treatment against her will provides no emotional, psychological, or medical benefit
to that woman.
[O]ne human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take
action to save another human being or to rescue . . . . For our law to
compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do so
would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule
which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the line
would be drawn.121
A policy that mandates gene therapy in utero for the benefit of the fetus would
likely place an unconstitutional undue burden on pregnant women. Donating blood
takes only about an hour, causes only slight discomfort, has no permanent side
effects, and is desperately necessary.122 Yet, courts refuse to compel blood donations
despite their simplicity and despite any arguments based on morality.123 “Most
people do not want to live in a society in which they can be compelled to undergo
surgery or sacrifice body parts, even if it would be morally incumbent upon them to
do so. Placing limits on what can be demanded of citizens, especially where bodily
integrity is involved, is essential to a free society.”124 “Surely . . . a fetus cannot have
rights . . . superior to those of a person who has already been born.”125

[his brother], emotionally and psychologically, and [the ward’s] well-being would be
jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a kidney.” Id.
Similarly, in Hart v. Brown, parents of identical seven year old twins sought to have a kidney
removed from the healthy twin to be transplanted into the seriously ill twin. See Hart v.
Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Supp. 1972). The hospital sought a court declaration that the
parents had the right to give their consent to the operation. Id. at 387. The court allowed the
kidney transplant based on the “immense benefit to the donor in that the donor would be better
off in a family that was happy than in a family that was distressed and in that it would be a
very great loss to the donor if the donee were to die from her illness.” Id. at 389-90.
Addditionally, in Little v. Little, the court granted a mother’s petition to remove the kidney of
her mentally incompetent daughter to be transplanted in her younger son based on the close
relationship between the donor and donee and both parents’ consent. See Hart v. Brown, 289
A.2d 386 (Conn. Supp. 1972).
121

See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa.D.3d 90, 91 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978).

122

See Bonnie Steinbock, Maternal-Fetal Conflict and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 781, 790 (1994).
123

Id. at 791.

124

Id. at 790.

125

In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990).
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B. The Discriminatory Impact and Treatment of Involuntary Gene Therapy on
Pregnant Women: Race, Gender, and Socio-economic Status
1. Race
If courts order a pregnant women to undergo gene therapy, racial minorities may
be treated discriminatorily. Historically, eugenics programs targeted both women,126
and minorities. In 1912, the Public Health Service gave immigrants intelligence tests
because the Service suspected that immigrants were a prime source of social
decline.127 “The inadequate genes of the people trying to gain entry to the United
States was ‘demonstrated’ by H.H. Goddard . . . who administered pen and paper
intelligence tests to exhausted, frightened individuals who had just landed on Ellis
Island. The results — 87% of the Russians, 83% of the Jews, 80% of the
Hungarians, and 79% of the Italians were found to be feebleminded.”128 In 1924,
Congress set quotas on the number of immigrants from various countries in response
to such “social decline.”129 By 1931, most states passed eugenic laws that authorized
the involuntary sterilization of certain groups of people.130
Furthermore, poor women of color are more likely to be deemed “unfit” and
subjected to sterilization abuse.131 The sterilization rates of poor women and women
of color are higher than those of white women.132 An estimated 30% to 42% of all
Native Americans have been sterilized and Hispanic women who neither spoke nor
understood English were often subjected to sterilization in Los Angeles.133
Some commentators predict that similar discrimination against ethnic minorities
will occur as gene therapy procedures continue to develop:
In the future, people thought to have genetic predisposition to crime might
be subject to gene therapy if it becomes usable . . . . Any medical
intervention to curtail the manifestation of alleged criminal genes would
be applied in a discriminatory fashion. African-American individuals are
more likely to be prosecuted than white individuals and African-American
individuals receive harsher sentences than Whites for similar crimes.134

126

See infra text accompanying notes 138-152.

127

See Harding, supra note 12, at 481.

128

Andrews, supra note 2, at 908 (citations omitted).

129

Id.

130

See Harding, supra note 12, at 481 (stating that thirty two states had passed
discriminatory eugenic laws).
131

See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, The Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1231 (1992).
132

Id. at 1232 (listing ethnic elitism, classism, and racism as reasons for the increased
sterilization rates among women of color and poor women).
133

Id.

134

Andrews, supra note 2, at 913-14.
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Lori Andrews states that out of twenty-one cases where court orders were sought
for prenatal interventions, 81% of the women were black.135 Court-ordered
Caesarean sections are disproportionately imposed on low-income women of
color.136 Furthermore, the majority of all court-ordered surgeries were performed on
women of color, many of whom were immigrants and refugees.137
Unfortunately, there is no compelling reason to believe that a court system that
discriminatorily applies criminal sentences would equally order gene therapy
procedures. On the other hand, courts could mandate gene therapy only on those
individuals thought to be “valuable” or “worthy” in our society. The expense that
will likely accompany gene therapy procedures may actually prohibit many
minorities from receiving gene therapy treatment in utero. Regardless, courts should
neither mandate nor prohibit gene therapy in utero.
2. Gender
Gender, like race, will also likely play a large role in a court’s decision to order
gene therapy. Historically, eugenics efforts disproportionately targeted women.138
The first American eugenics efforts — the institutionalization of the ‘feebleminded’
— concentrated largely on women.139 Some argue that geneticists and policy makers
saw promiscuous women as a social problem and developed institutionalization and
sterilization programs that forced women to behave in socially acceptable ways and
forbade them from creating children outside of marriage.140 For example, Carrie
Buck, the woman who was involuntarily sterilized and about whom Justice Holmes
stated that, “three generations of imbeciles is enough,”141 was not an imbecile.142 Ms.
Buck and her daughter both did well in school.143 Ms. Buck was institutionalized
because she was ‘immoral’ for having a child out of wedlock rather than because she
was ‘feebleminded.’144
The targeting of socially undesirable women continues today as “97% of
obstetricians favor sterilizing unmarried welfare mothers.”145 Although legislation
135

See LORI B. ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A LEGAL FRONTIER 236 (1987).

136

See Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating Women’s Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal Rights
Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 523 (1991).
137

See Nancy K. Kubasek, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 517 (1993).

138

See Andrews, supra note 2, at 906-07. “In the late 1800s, . . . [t]raits such as
feeblemindedness, criminality, pauperism, [and] prostitution . . . were thought to be single
gene defects.” Id. at 893-94.
139

Id. at 906.

140

Id. (citing Nicole H. Rafter, Claims-Making and Socio-Cultural Context in the First
U.S. Eugenics Campaign, 39 SOC. PROBS. 17-34 (Feb. 1993)).
141

See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

142

See Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 52 (1985).
143

Id.

144

Id.

145

Andrews, supra note 2, at 909.
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that requires involuntary sterilization of welfare women has not been passed, several
states have proposed legislation that provides financial incentives for welfare women
who implant contraceptives or undergo sterilization.146 Rosemarie Tong fears that
pregnant women who decline gene therapy will be punished and wrote the following
of individuals who are quick to punish women who do not have the perfect baby:
Currently, a relatively high number of citizens seem prepared to punish
women for ‘negligently, recklessly, or intentionally’ engaging in lifestyle
behaviors that result in serious, irreparable damage to their infants. Such
behaviors are believed to encompass everything from engaging in unsafe
sex with HIV-positive partners to not eating enough nutritious food,
working in toxic environments, drinking too much caffeine,
overexercising or underexercising, taking licit as well as illicit drugs that
might imperil fetal well-being, or failing to follow physicians’ orders.
Already, many pregnant women have been prosecuted and, in a few
instances, imprisoned for giving birth to cocaine-exposed infants. What
some feminists fear, then, is that if the concept of ‘fetal abuse’ or ‘fetal
negligence’ captures the public’s imagination, the public might decide to
punish not only pregnant women who do not ‘take care of themselves’ but
also pregnant women who do not submit to gene therapy for their
fetuses.147
Furthermore, women will likely fall further from social equality if gene therapy is
used for cosmetic purposes such as thinness or athletic ability. “Given that all too
many people will want their children to fit prevailing social norms, even when these
norms happen to be sexist, racist, and classist in nature, gene therapy for
enhancement purposes will only make the struggle for equity between men and
women that much more difficult.”148 The use of gene therapy for cosmetic purposes
could actually lead to an increase in genetic diseases as unexpected side effects
result from the alteration of the gene pool.149 For example, blond hair and blue eyes
have been linked to an increased susceptibility to skin cancer.150 A narrow gene pool
could also decrease the chances of human survival in the event of an epidemic. For
example, while the United States may attempt to obliterate sickle cell anemia and
cystic fibrosis, a recessive gene for sickle cell anemia or cystic fibrosis may be
necessary to survive in other parts of the world.151 The recessive sickle cell anemia
gene protects against malaria and the recessive cystic fibrosis gene protects against
cholera.152

146

Id.

147

ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST APPROACHES
239 (1997).

TO

BIOETHICS: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
148

Id. at 241.

149

See Weiss, supra note 103, at A1.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

Id.
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3. Socio-Economic Status
Since the 1800’s, the policy argument in favor of sterilizing criminals and the
feebleminded was that those individuals cost money to the rest of society.153 In
1907, Indiana enacted the first eugenics law that “provided for the involuntary
sterilization of institutionalized, unimprovable individuals who were idiots,
imbeciles, rapists, or habitual criminals.”154 Society could similarly support courtordered gene therapy in utero because of the societal financial costs associated with
the care of disabled children.155 Furthermore, health care providers may coerce
women to undergo gene therapy out of fear of liability for a child born with a genetic
disorder. There are documented accounts of physicians who pressure pregnant
women to abort genetically abnormal fetuses out of fear of liability.156
Any policy that mandates gene therapy in utero must realistically consider the
costs involved. Economically disadvantaged women cannot afford the extreme
expense that may be associated with gene therapy procedures.157 Similar to poor
women who must forego basic necessities and delay abortions until they can afford
them,158 mandated gene therapy in utero will likely deplete a pregnant woman of
valuable financial resources that could be used to care for her upcoming baby.
“[G]iven the absence of any national health insurance that would guarantee access of
all pregnant women to [gene therapy,] it would be illogical and most unfair to hold a
pregnant woman liable for failing to utilize a medical procedure that she was unable
to afford.”159 “[F]eminists who favor gene therapy aimed at treating diseases and
defects urge that it be provided to all women, rich or poor, on the grounds that all
women should have equal procreative freedom.”160
The combination of race, gender, and socio-economic status play a large role in
the societal definitions of who is “socially undesirable.” For example, obstetricians
almost unanimously agree that women on welfare should not continue to have
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See Andrews, supra note 2, at 894.

154
Id. at 895 (stating further that the Nazis modeled their sterilization law after the
American model).
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See Walsh, supra note 4, at 176 (“[S]ociety may reject children who are born with
disabilities and the women who chose to have them. These attitudes may be driven by pure
economics, since the public may fear the additional costs of caring for disabled children. . . .”).
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See Andrews, supra note 2, at 981.
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See TONG, supra note 147, at 240.

158

See Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 26 (Minn. 1995) (stating
both parties conceded that Medicaid-eligible women who are denied funding delay abortion
while seeking alternative funds and that women commonly cancel and reschedule
appointments a number of times while seeking alternative funds); Laura M. Friedman, Family
Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman’s Right to
Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 660 (1995).
159

TONG, supra note 147, at 141.

160

Id. Although I agree that all women should have equal procreative freedom, I disagree
with Rosemarie Tong’s statement that women should be provided gene therapy. I would
change Tong’s statement from “provided to all women” to “available to all women.”
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children.161 If society, the courts, or the legislature decide to force sterilization,
contraception, or gene therapy on individuals deemed socially undesirable, a clear
line cannot be drawn between those who are and are not worthy of bearing children.
Involuntary sterilization or mandated gene therapy of certain groups of people may
cross the line between preventing disease and serving clearly eugenic goals.162 If all
jailed criminals were sterilized, it would certainly be naive for anyone to think that
all crime would suddenly cease. Similarly, if pregnant women are forced to alter the
genes of their fetuses, it would be naïve to think that all genetic “abnormalities” or
“defects” would suddenly be eliminated.
C. Public Policy: The Impossible Ethical Dilemmas Involved in Determining Which
“Abnormalities” Should be “Fixed”
Everyone has their own notion of what constitutes a “meaningful” life. Everyone
most likely accepts that people should be free from pain at all times, should have
love and happiness in their lives, and should be able to function as independent
human beings. Quality of life issues arise when individuals pity or feel sorry for
others, or when individuals judge the decisions of others, especially parents. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to detach our own notions of a meaningful life. In In re
Sampson, the court overrode a mother’s decision to not force her fifteen-year-old son
to undergo several operations to correct a facial condition called
neurofibromatosis.163 Despite a lack of evidence that the teenager felt “abnormal” or
unhappy, the judge stated that, “whatever chance he may have for a normal, happy
existence . . . will unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement is not
corrected.”164
“The difficulty deciding which abnormalities should be fixed [i.e. by gene
therapy] stems from our notions of quality of life. Using our own conceptions of
what we think would not be worth living are imposed on whether we think other
individuals would want to live.”165 These “subjective assessments about the quality
of life of the child to be born”166 illustrate that it may be impossible to decide which
illnesses, or disabilities, gene therapy should “fix.”
Some individuals would likely support the abortion of a fetus with a serious
genetic defect or the correction of such a defect using gene therapy to prevent
“suffering.” The concept of “suffering”, however, is just as subjective as individual
views on “quality of life.” In fact, “health” and “disease” concepts and definitions

161

See supra text accompanying note 145.
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“Eugenics is generally defined as the ‘improvement of the human species by selective
breeding.” See Friedman, supra note 14, at 145. “Eugenics has been described as a social
movement to improve the human species through the use of technology.” See Harding, supra
note 12, at 477.
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See In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(N.Y. App. Div. 1971), aff’d, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972).
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Shepherd, supra note 5, at 798-99.
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always involve judgment calls.167 “Many well-meaning people who do not live with
disabilities will assume that a fetus with disabilities will suffer if brought to term.
Yet people living with disabilities and persons working and living with disabled
people often say otherwise.”168 Marsha Saxton, a disability rights activist who
suffers from spina bifida, states that, “people with disabilities as a group do not
suffer any more than any other group or category of humans.”169 Every human being
suffers at some time for some reason.170 There is no way to objectively determine
whether another person’s suffering is worth living with or if such a person would
have been better off never being born. There are many historical examples of people
who believe that suffering, no matter how severe, is acceptable and sometimes
honorable when certain principles such as family, country, religion, or culture are at
stake.171 “Relieving a fetus [who has a genetic disease] of the burden of a life . . .
might not be as kind-hearted as it initially appears, but rather may show a lack of
human caring, acceptance, and respect.”172
In fact, defining the term “disability” remains challenging because of medical
and technological advances and society’s changing perceptions of “disabled”
persons. For example, the American deaf community generally considers deafness
to be a “culture” rather than a “disability.”173 “Rather than disabled, the deaf are a
cultural, linguistic minority. . . . So strong is the feeling of cultural solidarity that
many deaf parents cheer on discovering that their baby is deaf.”174 The Deaf
President Now revolution at Gallaudet University has drawn comparisons to the
Stonewall Riot for gays and lesbians.175 Roslyn Rose, president of the National
Association of the Deaf, analogizes deafness with race by stating that, “[i]n our
society everyone agrees that whites have an easier time than blacks. But do you
think a black person would undergo operations to become white?”176
167

See Weiss, supra note 103, at A1 (quoting LeRoy Walters, the Director of Georgetown
University’s Kennedy Institute for Ethics, as saying, “There will be clear-cut cases where
everyone in the world will agree, ‘this is a disease,’ but the concept of health and disease at the
margin will always involve judgment calls.”).
168

Shepherd, supra note 5, at 782; see also Walsh, supra note 4, at 151-52, 168 (“Are
programs aimed at the improvement of the overall genetic quality of the population or the
elimination of genetic disease in complete conflict with the recognition of the rights and value
of the disabled? Why do we reject the disabled under the guise of compassion for their
suffering?”).
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Marsha Saxton, Prenatal Screening and Discriminatory Attitudes About Disability, 13
WOMEN & HEALTH 217, 222 (1988).
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See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 783-84 (1995).
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Id. at 782.
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See Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 549, 570 (1997).
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Id. at 571. Another activist rhetorically asked, “When Gorbachev visited the U.S., he
used an interpreter to talk to the President. Was Gorbachev disabled?” Id. at 572.
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The U.S. Supreme Court recently addressed these difficulties and decided that
individuals infected with HIV are “disabled” within the meaning of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”).177 Under Bragdon v. Abbott, asymptomatic
individuals infected with HIV are disabled under the ADA and thereby protected
from discrimination based on their disability.178
Another factor that makes it impossible to determine the genetic defects to which
a court might order gene therapy is the wide spectrum of individual values and
disabilities. Where do we draw the line between gene therapy and eugenics? In
1994, China passed legislation that required abortions of fetuses that carried
hereditary diseases or were otherwise abnormal.179 If gene therapy is permissible to
relieve suffering, what level or threshold of suffering must be met?180 “What
about . . . Down’s syndrome, emotional instability, lack of artistic skill, athletic
incompetence, shortness, or freckles? . . . If diabetes, sickle-cell anemia, and cancer
are to be cured by altering the genetic makeup of an individual, why not proceed to
other ‘disorders’: myopia, color blindness, left-handedness.”181 This problem
becomes even more complex when genetic predispositions to disease are considered.
The concepts of “health” and “normality
” would become narrow, socially-determined standards.182
Furthermore, studies suggest that society will desire to alter or correct genes for
reasons other than preventing disabilities or diseases, based on the wide range of
attitudes regarding disabilities and diseases. One study evaluated the attitudes of
parents of children with cystic fibrosis and found that the percentage of women who
would abort fetuses with genetic disorders varied depending on the disorder.183
Fifty-eight percent would abort a severely mentally retarded fetus during the first
trimester.184 Twenty percent would abort a fetus with cystic fibrosis and 17% would
abort if the fetus would develop a painful and incurable disorder by age forty.185
These attitudes toward abortion from those familiar with genetic diseases supports
the inference that most women would choose to undergo gene therapy for serious
diseases or disorders. An alarming outcome of that study was that 12% of those
surveyed would abort a fetus that was predisposed to suffer from severe and
177

See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998).
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However, “[e]very agency to consider the issue under [§ 504 of] the Rehabilitation Act
[which prohibits discrimination based on disability] found statutory coverage for persons with
asymptomatic HIV.” Id. at 2207.
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See Shepherd, supra note 5, at 779 n.94. The law, titled the ‘Maternal and Infantile
Health Care Law,’ was, in draft form, titled, ‘Eugenics and Health Protection,’ but was
renamed following criticism from the West. Id.
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See Harding, supra note 12, at 511-12.

181

Id.

182

See Munayyer, supra note 10, at 698-99.
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See Dorothy C. Wertz et al., Attitudes Toward Abortion Among Parents of Children
with Cystic Fibrosis, 81 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 992, 992 (1991). Severe mental retardation
was the most crucial factor in deciding to abort. Id.
184

Id.
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Id.
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untreatable obesity.186 Similarly, 3% would abort a fetus with a treatable physical
defect such as cleft palate or nearsightedness, 2% would abort a fetus that was
predisposed to alcoholism, and 0.4% would abort a fetus that was not the sex desired
by the parents.187 This study illustrates the extreme difficulties that face courts,
legislatures, and society as a whole when deciding what “illnesses” must be “fixed”
by gene therapy in utero.
Another study found that the percentage of women who would terminate their
pregnancy varied based on the probability of the fetus being affected.188 There was a
“sharp increase in the number of women saying that they would have an abortion
when the probability of the fetus being affected rose from 95 to 100 percent.”189
However, thirty-nine women [out of almost five hundred surveyed] said they would
not abort even if there was a 100% chance that the fetus had a neural tube defect.”190
Another study shows that most Americans will take advantage of gene therapy
when it becomes safe, effective, and somewhat routine.191 However, those surveyed
would use gene therapy for reasons other than prevention of disability or disease.192
Forty-three percent approved the use of gene therapy to improve their childrens’
physical characteristics and 42% approved the use of gene therapy to improve their
childrens’ intelligence level.193
It is impossible to objectively determine whether another person’s fetus should be
aborted or genetically altered. Attitudes toward suffering and disability are so
subjective that gene therapy for one woman’s fetus may be a good idea while gene
therapy for another woman’s fetus with the same “disability” may not be. Courts
should refrain from imposing their own notions of when life is or is not worth living
or imposing gene therapy to alter another person’s quality of life.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some predict that gene therapy issues will eventually swallow the abortion
issue.194 “With every step toward perfecting the control of genetics and procreation,
abortion becomes a mere relic — a crude, draconian attempt from a bygone age to
affect propagation.”195 Regardless of whether this prediction has merit, issues
surrounding gene therapy will certainly continue to be debated. Societal and
individual conceptions of morality, suffering, health, and desirability of certain traits
186

Id. at 994 fig. 2.
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See Ruth R. Faden et al., Prenatal Screening and Pregnant Women’s Attitudes Toward
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blur the line between gene therapy for the prevention of disease and gene therapy for
purely eugenic purposes. If courts order pregnant women to undergo gene therapy in
utero despite the undue burden on women and the lack of a rescue doctrine for those
already living, “the social focus, whether scientifically realistic or not, shifts from
encouraging tolerance of human diversity to developing methods to avoid it.”196
Discrimination would expand from race, gender, and socio-economic status to
include those who are genetically “inferior.” The decision to undergo gene therapy
in utero should be the private decision solely for a pregnant woman.
[I]n a more ideal world where economic differences, if they exist, do not
affect decisions of medical care or childbearing, where carrier screening
and prenatal screening can accurately predict to the one-thousandth
percent the likelihood and severity of expression of genetic traits, where
prenatal screening and fetal therapies are, with perfect accuracy,
medically recommended and performed without risk to mother or fetus,
where in vitro fertilization to allow perfect gene replacement of the
deleterious gene is widely available, safe, and effective, still, in that
world, I maintain, a woman should be allowed to have a child with genetic
differences. . . . If two deaf adults, or two adult dwarfs, wish to have a
child and are comfortable with the possibility that they may pass on genes
for deafness or dwarfism to their offspring . . . we [should] respect the
prospective parents’ decision to ‘let nature take its course.’197

196

See Munayyer, supra note 10, at 699.

197

Shepherd, supra note 5, at 796, 798-99.
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